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Indeed, it is the distress caused by the content of the Agreement that has provoked such
widespread alarm and division within Unionism. The proposals contained in the Agreement are
not remarkably new in content, but they now have the endorsement of those who were previously
opposed to such mechanisms that will fundamentally undermine the status of Northern Ireland
within the Union and impose a system of government so alien that it is far removed from any
known concept of democracy and fairness. According to the author’s copy of the Mitchell draft,
the UUP lost out on the number of seats for each of the eighteen constituencies, on the issues
that the parallel consensus mechanism should be applied, on the party from which the Chair of the
Assembly should come, on the sharing out of committee posts, on where executive authority ought
to be vested, on the content of the pledge of office, and on the status of the Executive Committee.
PEACE AGREEMENT-OR LAST PIECE IN A
SELLOUT AGREEMENT?
Dr. Ian R.K Paisley, MP, AIEP*
INTRODUCTION
In Northern Ireland today there prevails an unbelievable sit-
uation. British democracy has been trampled into the ground.
The civil rights and cultural heritage of the Protestant and
Unionist majority are being systematically eroded because a Gov-
ernment that has totally failed to deal with Irish Republican ter-
rorism is instead continuing its headlong capitulation to the vio-
lence and threats of the IRA and its political wing, Sinn F6in.
Northern Ireland is paying for England's peace. In order to
avoid a repetition of the atrocities of the Warrington and Canary
Wharf bombs, the British government is selfishly appeasing the
crocodile of a violent terrorist minority. Britain has shamelessly
abandoned its support for the democratic and constitutional
rights of a peaceful majority, which it is attempting to sedate
with the contrived propaganda of a counterfeit peace.
The depth of political depravity to which the British govern-
ment has sunk in its self-destructive urge to appease the forces of
the pan-Nationalist conspiracy is perfectly symbolized in the cur-
rent mass release of terrorist prisoners onto the streets of North-
ern Ireland, many of them guilty of the vile maiming, butcher-
ing, and murdering of their innocent victims, and all of them
now enabled to return to and to use their intact stockpile of
weaponry and explosives when their fascist aims are not
achieved-an arsenal that, despite the provisions of the so-called
Good Friday Agreement, the IRA now says that it will not decom-
mission.
This situation is the fruit of three decades of appeasement
of the Irish Republican agenda. It has been brought about by
the progressive and ill-disguised treachery of the British govern-
ment through the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement,1 the
* Dr. Paisley is the leader of the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party.
1. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K.-Ir. Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in ToM HADDEN & KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREE-
MENT 15-48 (1989) [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agreement].
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Downing Street Declaration, 2 the Framework Document,' and
the Downing Street Communiqu64 without the consent of the
people of Northern Ireland, followed by the most recent decep-
tion in the form of the Belfast Agreement (or "Good Friday
Agreement"), which most Unionists rejected and which was
foisted on the people of this Province by means of a massively-
financed campaign of misrepresentation by the government and
the Official Unionist Party, the latter of which fell headlong for
the ploy. Each of these documents proved to be a successive
stage in an orchestrated campaign to remove Northern Ireland
from the United Kingdom and to force the Province into a
united Ireland against the will of its majority.
They succeeded in eroding the Constitutional position of
Northern Ireland by stealth; in shedding its lifeblood through
the destruction of the Government of Ireland Act; and in silenc-
ing the democratic voice by corrupting the universally accepted
principle of consent and self-determination so that it became
submerged in an all-Ireland dimension.
A. White House Interference
One of the prime authors. of the present chaos has been
President Clinton, whose blatant interference in Northern Ire-
land's affairs, to the extent of overtly promoting the Sinn Fein/
IRA cause out of electoral self-interest, was nothing short of
open encouragement of terrorism, besides breaching the U.N.
Charter and the Helsinki Accord. The fact that this so-called
"peace" deal was soon followed by the mindless atrocity carried
out by depraved Irish Nationalist fanatics in Omagh is in large
measure a result of Clinton's elevation of the Sinn Fain Presi-
dent to the disguised status of a respectable democratic politi-
tion.
The full truth has still to be revealed about how much of the
money secured by Gerry Adams' fundraising trips sponsored by
Clinton and the White House went towards paying for the ingre-
dients and logistics of the Omagh bomb. A man who, without
2. The Joint Declaration by An Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, T.D., and the Brit-
ish Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P., Dec. 15, 1993, U.K-Ir., Cm. 2442
[hereinafter Downing Street Declaration].
3. A New Framework for Agreement, Dec. 1994, 34 I.L.M. 946 (1995).
4. Downing Street Communique, Nov. 29, 1995.
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shame, was ultimately forced to make the ignominious admis-
sion that he misled his country, his Government, and his wife as
a philanderer must be considered equally capable of misleading
the people of Northern Ireland about the real extent of his in-
volvement with Sinn Fain/IRA as a politician. He displayed his
hypocrisy in portraying himself as the great warrior against ter-
rorism in Africa and Iraq while overtly welcoming the godfather
of Irish Republican terrorism to the White House. While legiti-
mizing retaliatory strikes against Sudan, he did not bomb IRA
Weapons dumps in the Irish Republic from where the IRA is
predominantly operational. While denouncing the "twisted
logic" of terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies, the arch-sponsor of
Irish Republican terrorism displayed his own twisted logic by
donning the garb of the world's anti-terrorist policeman.
B. The Fruits of Appeasement
What the so-called peacemakers have sown, they have now
begun to reap, and it is the people of Northern Ireland who are
still being targeted in the process. The fact is that if decommis-
sioning had not been shelved and if IRA/Sinn F~in had been
forced to surrender its weapons and explosives, the Omagh
atrocity could not have occurred. By the same token, if the pre-
cipitation of concessions by the government had not included
the dismantling of security, the grief at Omagh would have been
avoided.
Having ignored all past warnings-together with all their
vindication-that the "peace process" was a tactic and a fake, Mr.
Blair's Government still incredibly continues its obstinate pursuit
of the selfsame agenda, attempting to extricate itself from its
own mess by blaming the Omagh bomb on so-called "dissidents"
and peddling the lie that the only choice facing Northern Ire-
land is the choice between continuing the farcical "peace pro-
cess" and a return to violence. The truth is that the "peace pro-
cess" is the violence and the violence is the peace process. The
concessions that hold it in place have bred the violence, and the
violence will continue to thrive on the concessions, simply be-
cause no compromise can ever satisfy the absolutist fascist ideals
of Irish Republicanism. If the British government has not by
now learned the lesson that violence is not assuaged by endless
concessions to a false peace process, but generated and culti-
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vated by them, then it is time for a radical reversal of its disas-
trously failed policy.
The price of appeasement of Sinn Fain/IRA in the wake of
the Belfast Agreement, far from bringing an end to violence, has
been the continuation of a campaign of terror and intimidation
that has cost the taxpayer almost £10 million. Staggering figures
have been compiled by FAIT, Families against Intimidation and
Terror. The costs involved hospital treatment for victims, com-
pensation paid to victims, and rehousing of both civilians and
members of the security forces. FAIT spokesman Vincent Mc-
Kenna has said that the figures reflect the hidden cost of terror,
even in this so-called period of peace. The vast majority of at-
tacks, he says, have been carried out by the military wings of
those political groupings already sitting in the Assembly at Parlia-
ment Buildings, Belfast. In a breakdown of costs, compiled with
the assistance of government agencies, FAIT says that treatment
for victims of loyalist shootings (34) cost £340,000, while IRA
shootings (38) cost £380,000. Compensation for loyalist shoot-
ings was £272,000 and IRA shootings £304,000. Loyalist beatings
(85) cost £510,000, while IRA beatings (80) cost £480,000. Com-
pensation for loyalist beatings cost £425,000 and for IRA beat-
ings £400,000. Rehousing members of the security forces
threatened by terrorists cost £2.4 million and rehousing 242 fam-
ilies £1.75 million. Relocating a total of 440 families exiled by
both the IRA and loyalists cost £1.5 million with £44,000 being
paid for travel out of the country. Social security payments to
victims amounted to £1,114,000.
Such has been the result of the early release of unrepentant
and unreformed terrorist prisoners with no linkage whatsoever
to arms decommissioning, and yet more than 250 unrepentant
and unreformed terrorist murderers are already being released.
If the Omagh bombing could take place even before the prison
floodgate has been opened, what can the people of Northern
Ireland expect when all the murderers and wreckers are finally
released onto our streets to return to their intact stockpiles of
weaponry and deploy them when events do not move in the di-
rection that they desire.
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT
Since 1981, when Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey
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first discussed the "totality of relationships within these Islands,"
the principle was established that the British government would
only move in unison with the Irish Republic in relation to North-
ern Ireland. British sovereignty was weakened, and in 1985, with
the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 5 (or "1985 Agree-
ment"), the integrity of the Union between Great Britain and
Northern Ireland was further damaged by a formal interference
in our affairs, over the heads of. the people, and with the express
purpose of legitimizing the Irish Republic's claim to have a say in
how the people of Northern Ireland are governed.
The 1985 Agreement gave the Dublin government a right to
be consulted on policy and a direct say through the Anglo-Irish
Conferences on any area of government policy. It has only been
with time that the powerful and interfering nature of this body
has come to public attention. From suggesting minor govern-
ment appointments to demanding changes in security policy,
the remit of the Conference is unmeasurable. The Irish govern-
ment has even secreted funds for the purpose of making pay-
ments to those who collaborate with the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
Publicly, the two governments claimed that a tandem ap-
proach would help to marginalize the men of violence; secretly,
they hoped that it would strengthen the SDLP, but in reality the
reason why there was an agreement was because of the men of
violence. A feature of the British-Irish relationship has been
their inability to have the will to tackle terrorism effectively. In-
stead, they have moved to a different kind of deal with terrorism.
Unionists with a single voice in political solidarity opposed
the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They protested about it, they cam-
paigned against it, they asked questions in Parliament about its
operation, they fought elections over it, and some went to jail
because of it; but it has remained in place. Northern Ireland,
although part of the Union, is not governed like any other part.
Government response to terrorism, instead of rejection of terror-
ism, has seen to it that Northern Ireland is a place apart.
Failing to marginalize the men of violence but rather spur-
ring them on, the governments refused to draw back from this
policy of failure. Instead, since 1985, they have built upon these
unsteady and uncertain foundations. The governments have
also selectively picked off .those in the Unionist circle who they
5. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra note 1.
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believed could be bought, bribed, or beaten into embracing the
principle of Dublin having a say in Northern Ireland. No one
imagined just how successful they would be in undermining
Unionist unity. On a policy front, the wordsmiths began to re-
spin the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
After the failure of the first round of Multi-Party Talks at
Stormont, ending in November 1992, the governments were
able to expose a division within Unionism in the way Unionists
believed Ulster should be governed. On the last day of the
Brooke-Mayhew Talks, the UUP produced a paper proposing
"all-Ireland bodies with executive power."
The issue of all-Ireland bodies with executive powers had
now been placed on the negotiating table without the removal of
Ireland's illegal territorial and jurisdictional claims. It was clear
there were Unionists who could tolerate Dublin's involvement in
our affairs!
The two governments got to work, and in December 1993
they produced the Anglo-Irish Agreement's successor, the Down-
ing Street Declaration,6 which formalized further the concept of
all-Ireland executive authority in Northern Ireland's affairs.
This short communiqu6 had over thirty references to the new
designation for the people of Northern Ireland. From the
Downing Street Declaration onwards we became the "People of
Ireland North and South."
Unionism's response to that Declaration was one of divi-
sion, not unity. At last the chink in the armor had been found.
The Ulster Unionist Party was prepared to move on the issue of
principle-Dublin's say was now recognized as legitimate.
Political events in Northern Ireland have at their center vio-
lence emanating from Republicanism. Throughout this period
from the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement to the latest
Good Friday deal, the UUP has been forced to change political
direction because of the violence of the IRA. They were bombed
into negotiations with the IRA and stayed in those negotiations
while the IRA continued their bombing and murder campaign.
Successive British Governments have failed in their duty to
deliver effective security measures and to introduce accountable
structures of government to the Province. The legacy of the An-
6. Downing Street Declaration, supra note 2.
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glo-Irish Process has been to give the whip hand to IRA/Sinn
Fin as they drive forward the vehicle for Irish Unity.
Responding to violence in this manner only pays political
dividends to those who are violent. Those committed to demo-
cratic means, armed only with the power of the ballot box and
the arguments for their case, cannot achieve any momentum for
their cause if they enter into dialogue, negotiations, or dealings
with those who use both politics and the bullet, bomb and
balaclava.
The IRA has used both violence and politics to achieve their
political ends. In a policy paper outlining how to deploy vio-
lence and politics as a dual strategy, the IRA accept the legiti-
macy of "the tactical use of the armed struggle." Since the 1994
they have demonstrated how adept they can be at using the two-
pronged approach and they can show their political supporters
and their violent volunteers gains made as a result of this prac-
tice.
Today, the political atmosphere is so putrefied by their pres-
ence that the threat of violence is as potent as actual violence.
The use of violence extracted the Downing Street Declaration; it
was brought about by the blackmail of the "permanent cessation
of IRA violence." The threat of a return to violence and the
breakdown of that ceasefire with a murderous bomb at Canary
Wharf in London's Docklands brought about the publication of
the Framework Document in February 1995, which is the
blueprint of the current Good Friday deal. Violence really does
pay!
With the Government fixated on the promise of peace, they
have pursued a peace process that is in the shape and image of
what the IRA will accept. It is not about finding a real, lasting, or
just peace, but is about finding what will be enough political con-
cessions to buy the support of IRA/Sinn F~in.
In 1996, the Government established a new talks process
designed to produce a new agreement that would have the sup-
port of the parties, Parliament, and the people. It was to operate
on a three stranded basis to include relationships in Northern
Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland,
and between the two Islands. Those at the table had to be com-
mitted to "exclusively peaceful means."
The only way democrats could be satisfied that the parties
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were committed to exclusively peaceful means was by the surren-
dering of illegal weapons. After all, if the parties were commit-
ted to peace, they would never again need those weapons to
wreck the peace. The issue of decommissioning, however, has
proved to be the searchlight of truth. The Governments refused
to let the "peace train" leave the station until the politicians had
abandoned the principle of decommissioning. The refusal of
the Government to proceed without the IRA permitted sufficient
space and time for the IRA to put in place a second phony
ceasefire. For one year democrats were expected to tread water
until the IRA was admitted to the talks in September 1997.
Only by holding on to decommissioning could the parties at
the table be persuaded that the terrorism was over for good.
Every excuse in the book of excuses was deployed to avoid
decommissioning. Claims that it is not in the psychology of re-
publicanism to surrender, that the guns will rust, even the ab-
surdity that decommissioning would wreck the peace, were all
used to avoid the issue. It has subsequently emerged that
throughout the period the Government was in secret communi-
cation with the leadership of the IRA and, according to Judge
Travers, had given several assurances to the IRA that members
would not be prosecuted and an immunity granted to certain
terrorist organizations.
Decommissioning could have kept IRA/Sinn Fain out of the
process. In September 1997 the Leaders of the DUP and UUP
met to draw up principles that would help guide them in the
process. The two Leaders identified two issues that they said
were fundamental. One was the issue of consent; the second was
decommissioning. They agreed the following joint communi-
qu&
Joint Statement by Ulster Unionist Party and Democratic
Unionist Party:
The Leaderships of the UUP and UDUP had a construc-
tive meeting this afternoon.
The two parties are totally agreed that the principle of
consent which is the right of the people of Northern Ireland
alone to determine their own future is a fundamental gov-
erning principle which must apply in all circumstances. This
principle must be accepted by the Government and all par-
ties.
Our two parties are also agreed that the issue of the
PEACE AGREEMENT-OR LAST PIECE?
decommissioning, i.e. the handing over of illegal terrorist
weaponry, must be resolved to their satisfaction before there
could be substantive political negotiations.
Recognising the need for greater Unionist unity of ap-
proach at this critical time, the parties have agreed to meet
again shortly.7
Within a matter of weeks Trimble abandoned these princi-
ples. He moved from demanding the actual decommissioning of
Weapons before negotiations commenced to having the issue
"pigeon-holed." Effectively, he gave up on the issue. The aban-
donment allowed the IRA to enter with their terrorist machinery
intact and their credibility inflated.
The process itself was fundamentally flawed. The chairman-
ship of the talks was predetermined before the process com-
menced. An American (Sen. George Mitchell), a Canadian, and
the former Finnish Prime Minister were charged with the task of
chairing the Multi-Party Talks process. Putting them into the
process insured the United States" crucial involvement. It inter-
nationalized a domestic political and terrorist situation and has
removed forever the prospect of the people of Northern Ireland
having real control over their own destiny. We are now a puppet
on an international stage being pulled this way and that in an
obscene effort to please the international community.
Not only was the chairman predetermined, but so too was
the agenda. Far from the participants' having a "blank sheet of
paper," they were presented with an agenda designed to pro-
duce the Framework Document outcome. Participants had little
function in the process other than to agree an already produced
deal between the two Governments in anticipation that the IRA
would accept it. The whole center of gravity of the process was
to appease terrorism.
The predetermined agenda was matched by an unalterable
outcome. The Framework Document blueprint can be read side
by side with the Good Friday Deal and there is little to distin-
guish between the two documents.
With the IRA's inclusion in the talks, the DUP, in accord-
ance with its mandate, left the process. It is to the eternal shame
of the Leader of the UUP that he, too, did not disembark at that
7. IAN PAISLEY, JR., PEACE DEAL? 8 (1998) (quoting the Joint Statement by Ulster
Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party).
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point. He was committed to staying in because he .did not want
to be "blamed" for bringing the talks. to an end. At his side he
kept the gangsters and murderers of loyalist paramilitarism. He
used them to hide behind, but was in reality being used by the
Governments whose aim was to get the Leader of the UUP to
sign up to a deal acceptable to the President of IRA/Sinn Fin.
Sinn F~in/IRA made no secret of their strategy. Speaking
to IRA activists in South Armagh, IRA/Sinn Fain "peace" negoti-
ator Francie Molloy outlined the movement's plan. He exposed
the so-called peace process as a mere phase of the armed strug-
gle and said: 'This phase of negotiations may fall apart, it may
not succeed. And whenever that does happen then we simply go
back to what we know best. '"
He encouraged the crowd to examine the Agreement care-
fully and to consider if it advances their goal of a United Ireland,
asking whether it was "a good tactic or a bad tactic. If you go a
way with one message today, go away with the fact that the strug-
gle continues. We will not give up until we reach our goal."9
He was following a similar strategy to that outlined by Gerry
Adams. Twenty-four hours after the Agreement, Adams told a
Republican rally: "The struggle continues and will continue un-
til the British army are out of our country, until partition has
ended. We want freedom, demilitarisation, the equality agenda,
the release of all the political prisoners. We are sticking with
this. We need your support. We need you to get your heads
around what is happening and let's move forward together."
Clearly, the IRA leadership views this Agreement as only
part of a continuing process. Unionists have fallen into a trap
that it is possible to find a settlement with Nationalists, yet
Republicans are not playing the same game. They are seeking
eternal process until Unionists accept a United Ireland. The
Ulster Unionist Party Leader lost the plot some time ago, believ-
ing that he could find a settlement, when in reality he has been
contributing to the politics of process, not the politics of pro-
gress. Bertie Ahern, the Dublin Prime Minister, when asked the
week following the Agreement if he believed that a United Ire-
land was now possible, said: "Britain is now effectively out of the
8. Id. (quoting Francie Molloy).
9. Id.
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equation. There is nothing to stand in the way of unification."1
Throughout the process the British Government has acted
with gross contempt for the Unionist people of Northern Ire-
land. On coming to office, Prime Minister Tony Blair visited the
Balmoral Show and proclaimed his Unionist credentials-that
the Union would not end in his lifetime. However, since May
1997 he has driven forward a process that has visibly weakened
the Union and supports a deal that will end the Northern Ire-
land's place in the Union. His Government has schemed and
has planned this dismembering of the Union. The Government
has been assisted in its plan by the compliance of the UUP
Leader.
That compliance was exposed in February 1998 in a leaked
secret communication from Tony Blair's private Secretary John
Holmes to Mo Mowlam's office. The letter revealed details of a
meeting held in Washington between the Prime Minister and
senior American politicians. It revealed that as early as February
1998, David Trimble had agreed to the concept and model of all-
Ireland bodies but that certain "presentational difficulties" re-
main unresolved. The Prime Minister believed David Trimble
had "signed up to the all-Ireland structures," that his "differ-
ences of substance" with Sinn Fin/IRA, the SDLP, and the Irish
Government are "not as great as is often thought."" The Prime
Minister is reported to claim that "Trimble had come a great
deal further than many Unionists wanted him .to, for example
accepting North-South structures," and the Government believes
"that giving comfort to the Ulster Unionists was vital. 1' 2 Trimble
must be encouraged to "advocate change without making him-
self vulnerable to charges of betrayal."' 3
Trimble had, the previous January, agreed to the "Proposed
Heads of Agreement." This document was not far removed from
the final version of the Agreement. The Prime Minister had re-
alized from then on that it was not a matter of "if' Trimble
would sign up to the final deal but "when." From February an
elaborate plan was put in place to manipulate public opinion
behind the peace process and pressure Unionists into an agree-
10. Id. at 10 (quoting Bertie Ahern).
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ment with the IRA. A fall-back position of going to the people
"over the heads of their political leaders" was outlined by Tony'
Blair.
This manipulation of public opinion was revealed in March
when another leaked NIO document written by the Secretary of
State's new Director of Communications highlighted the devious
meatheads to be deployed in the selling of this Agreement. The
plan included using taxpayers' money to manipulate opinion
polls. The Government strategy document outlined how the
Government would lie to the people. It says: "Not all of the re-
sults of opinion polling, etc., will be in the public domain." In
other words, the truth has to be hidden. It continues: "Senior
media people" will be encouraged to do certain polling where
"the results are likely to be supportive" of the Agreement.
A Public Relations company McCann Erickson has already
been commissioned to carry out research "without it being seen
to be Government-inspired."
A Civil Servant, Tony McCusker, was commissioned to iden-
tify a list of "key movers and shakers" to be used as puppets on a
string to serve the Government's agenda. "Representative
figures" from business, religion, and community are to be ex-
ploited. The paper says: "We should, where possible, be enlist-
ing the help of these people to champion our cause, e.g. Robin
Eames and other church leaders, the heads of community orga-
nizations and trade unions and other members of the G7."
The Government paper concludes: "While overt manipula-
tion could only be counter-productive, a carefully co-ordinated
timetable of statements from these people will be helpful in giv-
ing our message credibility with those they represent. It has the
added benefit of providing a fresh face for that message, and
ensuring that it is not only the Government which is seen to be
selling the process." The voice would be the voice of the movers
and shakers, but the words would be the words of the Govern-
ment!
It is clear that all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle to remove
Unionists from the Union have been identified and are now be-
ing put into place. Unionists are being asked to commit an act
of collective communal suicide by voting themselves out of the
Union. We have been told that we have a "choice" and the "deci-
sion is ours," but in reality there is no choice on offer. The
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Agreement before the people does not allow for any alternatives
to be considered. The Government has refused to concede that
if it fails to gain the support of the people, it should implement a
Unionist alternative. The Government and all the parties to the
Agreement appear interested only in a solution that appeases
IRA terrorism. The problem is that no solution other than the
surrender of Unionism is acceptable to Republicans.
The claim that there is "no alternative" does not mean that
a better, more broadly acceptable alternative does not exist, but
that a violent and absolutist terrorist minority will not allow it to
be considered.
II. THE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT
All the participants in the negotiations pledged that they
would "in good faith work to ensure the success of each and
every one of- the arrangements to be established under this
Agreement." Furthermore, they stated that "in a spirit of con-
cord" they strongly commended the Agreement to the people,
north and south, "for their approval." Each "pledged" itself to
ensure the success of-among other things-IRA/Sinn Fain in
government, an all-Ireland Executive Council, the mass release
of terrorist prisoners, the decimation of the RUC, and the re-
moval of security with no requirement for the handing over of
illegal weaponry.
A. Intent
The "Declaration of Support" is a statement of intent to pro-
mote a new relationship. Fashioned in the sentimental language
of "rapprochement" and "reconciliation," the declaration is a
carefully and cunningly crated statement supposedly ushering
in a "new beginning" or "turning point" on the road to peace
and harmony in Northern Ireland. The declaration has the im-
print of those who support the intentions of the Deal identified
as the "participants in the multi-party negotiations." Impor-
tantly, that includes the Leader of the UUP, David Trimble, and
the President of IRA/Sinn Fain, Gerry Adams.
A reference to the tragedies of the past is quickly passed
over with a statement that the best way to honor that legacy is
through a fresh start. The declaration fails to point the finger at
those responsible for the tragedies because those responsible
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have not and will not accept responsibility or even apologize for
that violence waged on the innocents of Northern Ireland.
The signatories commit themselves to "strive" towards rec-
onciliation but only within this limited and predetermined
framework of "agreed arrangements." This rules out a commit-
ment to real and genuine democracy by the IRA/Sinn Fain par-
ticipants and is a bogus commitment to reconciliation.
Those making the declaration "accept" that the arrange-
ments are "interlocking and interdependent and in particular
the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South council
are so closely related that the success of each depends on that of
the other."
This is the crucial commitment because it explains that the
Agreement must be taken as a whole. Participants cannot
cherry-pick those aspects of it that suit their particular political
interpretation and disregard those matters which do not. It
commits David Trimble to the release of IRA terrorist prisoners,
to the undermining of the RUC, or, as he once colorfully ex-
pressed it, "putting prisoners into police uniforms," and to an
Assembly that guarantees an executive role to IRA/Sinn Fin
members.
The Assembly is not a stand-alone body or a predominant
partner in a relationship. It is "so closely inter-related" with the
North-South Council to be effectively one. For any Unionist to
argue that they have secured a Northern Ireland stand-alone
Parliament is to misrepresent just how far those same Unionists
who negotiated this Agreement with Sinn F~in/IRA have been
prepared to go down the road of United Ireland intentions.
Those intentions are affirmed in a "spirit of concord" or close
unity between Trimble and Adams. .
B. Framework
The framework of the Agreement traces the pattern estab-
lished by the Framework Documents. It sets out the three key
areas indicating its all-embracing nature. The Preamble is a dec-
laration of intent that commits its signatories to a new inter-rela-
tionship. It deals with the ideology of the Union versus that of
Irish unity, favoring the latter.
With the constitutional parameters of the Agreement estab-
lished, it moves on to the substance-the institutions of govern-
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ment. In detail, it proposes the mechanism of the relationship
at all levels, including Strand One: institutions in Northern Ire-
land; Strand Two: an all Ireland Ministerial Council; and Strand
Three: the British-Irish or Anglo-Irish Council and Intergovern-
mental Conference.
The deal then moves from institutions to identity issues.
These are summed up by the euphemistic title: "Rights, Safe-
guards and Equality of Opportunity." This fancy, non-partisan
jargon has become well-known shorthand for "Republican
supremacy" over Unionists. Rights and opportunities are for
one community-the Republican community-while safeguards
are without balance. Here, more fundamental changes to Brit-
ish legislation are outlined, thus distinguishing this part of the
United Kingdom from every other of its regions.
A joint all-Ireland committee is proposed to administer
rights issues, while the memory of the victims of violence is in-
sulted by including an all-embracing approach that considers
the perpetrators of violence as equal victims to the sufferers of
their violence. Tucked away in this part of the Agreement are
included economic, social, and cultural proposals that are
designed to alter the very identity of this region of the United
Kingdom.
The Agreement then moves on to issues concerning security
and protection. These include some of the most immediately
controversial proposals dealing with decommissioning, security,
policing, justice, and prisoners. Yet more institutions are estab-
lished including an International Commission on policing that
removes forever policing and the dispensing of justice from the
hands of the British government and puts them into the interna-
tional arena.
Finally, the Agreement outlines how it should be imple-
mented. It is surprisingly short in its duration. It is not the end
or a permanent settlement of this long dispute, but rather an
interim phase to be implemented and then reviewed within four
years.
C. Constitutional Issues
Instead of fulfilling the original objective of "balanced con-
stitutional change," the Agreement provided for the immediate
abolition of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which forms
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part of the title deeds of the United Kingdom's sole sovereignty
over Northern Ireland.14 In contrast to this, the illegal claims
contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution would
merely be amended. Furthermore, the changes in Articles 2 and
3 would take place on the condition that it is in exchange for the
subsequent illegal setting up of "institutions with executive pow-
ers and functions" for the whole of Ireland. Other parts of the
Irish Constitution that form the basis of Dublin's illegal claim
remain intact.1" Achieving the objective of Articles 2 and, 3
meant that there would be no further need for the Articles to he
retained in their original form.
Dublin made it clear, however, that even if the referendum
would be passed, as it was, it could revert to the original Articles
2 and 3 for up to one year later if the all Ireland executive pow-
ers were not implemented. 6 Hence, while the legal U.K. asser-
tion of supremacy is done away with irrevocably and immedi-
ately, the changes to Dublin's illegal claim are only conditional
and provisional.
As far as the so-called principle of consent is concerned, it is
provided that it is "for the people of the island of Ireland alone
... to exercise their right of self-determination."17 The right to
self-determination should be a matter for the people of North-
ern Ireland alone'.
It is made clear throughout the document that while there
are built in mechanisms to prevent any exercise of majority will
in Northern Ireland, as soon as there is a 50% + 1 majority for a
united Ireland, then legislation will be enacted at once to put us
into a united Ireland regardless of the views of the Unionist pop-
ulation."
D. Strand One: The Administration of Northern Ireland
The Assembly created by this Agreement is undemocratic
and gives nationalist parties an absolute veto on any key deci-
sions. Its existence depends explicitly on the continued exist-
ence of the all-Ireland North/South Ministerial Council set up
14. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, Constitu-
tional Issues, Annex A.
15. Id., Constitutional. Issues, Annex B.
16. See id.
17. Id., Constitutional Issues I(ii).
18. See id., Constitutional Issues, 1 (iv), Annex A.
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under Strand Two. Without the all-Ireland body, the Northern
Ireland Assembly has no role.
1. The Assembly
The new Assembly will not operate on any democratic basis
along the lines of Westminster or even our local Councils where
a simple majority vote is sufficient. In this Assembly, "key" deci-
sions are to be taken on a so-called "cross-community basis,"
which means that no decision can be made unless it has the
agreement of John Hume's SDLP and/or Gerry Adams' Sinn
F~in.19
While certain decisions are designated in advance as being
key decisions, the fact is that if thirty Assembly Members so de-
sire any decision can be turned into a "key" decision, which then
requires the approval of John Hume's SDLP or Gerry Adams'
Sinn F6in. The figure is set at thirty to ensure that between
them the SDLP and Sinn F6in can always make sure that deci-
sions will need their approval. 20
Within the Assembly there is to be a series of Committees.
It is provided that the parties, including Sinn F6in, have auto-
matic guaranteed places on all Committees and an automatic
guaranteed share of Committee Chairmanships.
21
The SDLP's policy of "parity of esteem" acquires a statutory
effect, and there will be an obligation to promote this SDLP pol-
icy.22
2. The Executive
The Executive Committee will be the Cabinet of Northern
Ireland. 23 The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are to be
elected jointly. Throughout the document the First Minister is
given no role independent of his deputy. They act together at
19. See id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Safeguards
5(d).
20. See id.
21. See id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Safeguards
5(a); id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Operation of the
Assembly 8.
22. See id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Safeguards
5(e).
23. See id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive
Authority 14.
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all times as joint leaders. Only those who have the consent of
John Hume's SDLP and/or Gerry Adams' Sinn Fain can be
elected to these posts. 24
As well as the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, there
are to be up to ten other Ministers. The bigger parties in the
Assembly, including Sinn Fain, have an automatic guaranteed
right to a place in the Executive as Ministers. Such Ministers
"will have full executive authority in their respective areas of re-
sponsibility. 25
There is absolutely no bar on Sinn Fain's taking their auto-
matically guaranteed places in the Executive even if the IRA
holds on to all its illegal weaponry.26 Once in office a Minister
can only be removed by a "cross-community" vote in the Assem-
bly. This means that the SDLP and/or Sinn Fin would have to
vote in favor of removal. 27
The Agreement maintains that those who hold office should
use only "democratic non-violent means, and those who do not
should be excluded or removed from office under these provi-
sions." Because the support of the SDLP and/or Sinn Ffin will
be needed, it is hard to imagine this ever happening. In any case
Sinn Fain would argue, as they did in the Talks, that they are
committed to democratic, non-violent means while the IRA are
separate and carry out violent activity on their own behalf.28
Once in Government it will be impossible ever to remove
Sinn Fain. Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness will have day to
day control of government departments with "full executive au-
thority."
E. Strand Two: North-South All-Ireland Arrangements
1. All-Ireland Ministerial Council
There is to be an all-Ireland Ministerial Council with execu-
tive powers. It is to be set up by Westminster and Dublin so it is a
free-standing body independent of the Northern Ireland Assem-
24. See id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive
Authority 1.
25. See id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive
Authority 24.
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bly. The Northern Ireland Assembly will cease to exist if the all-
Ireland body ceases to function. 29
The purpose of this all-Ireland body is threefold, namely to
develop: (a) consultation, (b) co-operation, and (c) action-on
an all-Ireland basis." It has, therefore, a wide remit that goes far
beyond mere discussion and consultation. It is obliged to reach
agreement on the adoption of common policies. It has the abil-




There is to be a series of all-Ireland bodies set up sub-
servient to the all Ireland Ministerial Council to implement deci-
sions taken by the Council.32 It is prescribed that by October 31,
1998-a deadline already passed-the all-Ireland Ministerial
Council must have in place a work program covering at least
twelve areas including agriculture, education, transport, environ-
ment, waterways, social security, tourism, EU programs, inland
fisheries, marine matters, health, and urban and rural develop-
ment. It is provided that there may also be other areas. It is
required that at least six of these areas must be identified for
implementation through the all-Ireland implementation bodies
on an all-Ireland basis. No powers will be transferred to the As-
sembly until this work is completed.33
Membership of the Council is organized so that there will
always be a permanent Unionist minority. There are to be three
Ministers from the Dublin government and three from Northern
Ireland (always including the First Minister and his deputy). In
cases where there will be a Sinn F6in or SDLP Minister, the
Council will therefore comprise three Dublin Ministers, two na-
tionalists/republicans from Northern Ireland, and one Union-
ist.34
Decisions can be taken in the Council without reference
back to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The only time that the
Assembly would be required to give approval to any decision of
29. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 1, 13
30. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 1.
31. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 1, 5(iii)-(iv), 6.
32. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 8; 9.
33. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 8.
34. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 2.
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the Council would be in the unlikely event of a Minister going
beyond his departmental responsibility. If he stays within it,
there is no approval of the Assembly needed. 5
Participation in the Council is an essential responsibility of
being a Minister.36 An all-Ireland Secretariat is set up to staff the
Council (one of two all Ireland Secretariats set up under this
Agreement) .37
The all-Ireland Council acquires a role in representing the
whole of Ireland at European Union meetings.3 ' The all-Ireland
dimension is further intensified through the creation of a joint
Dril/Assembly parliamentary forum. 9
F. Strand Three: The Relationship Between the Irish Republic and
the United Kingdom as a Whole
1. Institutions
There are two new institutions created under this strand.
The first institution is a British-Irish Council. This is simply a
consultative body for representatives of the British and Irish Gov-
ernments and devolved institutions in the United Kingdom. It
has no role whatsoever in relation to the North-South All-Ireland
Council, which is a totally free-standing, independent body.40
The second institution is a British-Irish Intergovernmental Con-
ference. This body takes over the role of the Anglo-Irish Confer-
ence set up under the Diktat of 1985. 1
It is wrong to claim that the Anglo-Irish Agreement has
gone. It is simply being renamed and recreated. The only dif-
ference is that (as provided for in the Anglo-Irish Agreement)
those areas that are now devolved to a new Assembly will no
longer come under the jurisdiction of the Conference. Other-
wise its role is the same.42
The Irish government is described as having "a special inter-
est in Northern Ireland." Dublin receives the right to put for-
ward views and proposals in relation to all non-devolved North-
35. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 6.
36. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 7 2.
37. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 16.
38. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 7 17.
39. See id., Strand Two, North/South Minsterial Council 18.
40. See id., Strand Three, British-Irish Council 1 1-12.
41. See id., Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference It 1-9.
42. See id., Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 5.
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ern Ireland matters in particular the areas of rights, justice, pris-
ons, policing, and security in Northern Ireland.4" The
governments are obliged to make determined efforts to resolve
disagreements between them. The all-Ireland and cross-border
aspects of these issues are to be intensified. The Conference is
to have a Secretariat. Maryfield may have gone in name but not
in substance.44
G. Sinn Fin's So-called 'Equality' Agenda: "Rights, Safeguards and
Equality of Opportunity"
The Agreement provides for a wide range of further conces-
sions to IRA/Sinn F6in and Nationalists.
1. Discrimination - Policies are to be introduced aimed at
"eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the
two communities," which means more discrimination against
Unionists and Protestants in jobs. A new Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission is to be set up to advise how in West-
minster legislation certain rights can be enshrined. These are to
reflect, among others, the SDLP's policy of "parity of esteem."
There is to be an obligation on all government and public bod-
ies to give equal validity to the "identity and ethos of both com-
munities" in Northern Ireland.
In a further boost to all-Ireland structures, human rights is-
sues are to be considered by a joint committee of the Northern
Ireland and Irish Republic's Human Rights Commissions.
2. Economic, Social and Cultural Issues - The Irish language is
to be facilitated and encouraged by the British government.
There is an eight-point action plan to ensure that the Irish lan-
guage is promoted by the government with strong financial sup-
port. There is no commitment whatsoever to equality for Union-
ist heritage and culture, nor is the Ulster-Scots language given
equal treatment.45
3. Decommissioning - There is no requirement for the hand-
ing over of illegal weaponry by any terrorist organization. Just as
the parties in the Talks proved their total weakness on this issue
during the Talks, they once again simply express the hope that
43. See id., Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 4-6.
44. See id., Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 8.
45. See id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Economic, Social and
Cultural Issues 4.
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decommissioning will occur. The governments undertake to set
up schemes for decommissioning, but there is no requirement
actually to hand over any weaponry.
4. Security - The Agreement provides for the removal of the
army including the Royal Irish Regiment from its present role;
the removal of all security installations; and the removal of the
security forces' emergency powers to deal with terrorists. The
Dublin government is to have an input about other measures.
46
5. The Royal Ulster Constabulary - The RUC is to be destroyed
in its present form. An independent commission with an inter-
national input is set up with terms of reference that make clear
that the RUC will be emasculated and destroyed.
6. Criminal Justice - There is to be a wide-ranging review of
criminal justice. The implementation of any recommendations
is to be discussed first with the Dublin government and the polit-
ical parties. The review covers appointment ofjudges, the prose-
cution process, law reform, and all-Ireland co-operation.
7. Terrorist Prisoners - All terrorist prisoners, including those
convicted of murder, are to be released within two years at the
latest and in most cases much earlier.
H. Future Development
This is not the end of the process. It is merely another stag-
ing post on the road to a united Ireland, which builds upon all
the other initiatives including the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the
Downing Street Declaration, and the Framework Document. It
is provided that the all-Ireland institutions and bodies set up
under this Agreement are capable of further development.
I. The Terms of the Agreement Are the Only Arbiter
It is this Agreement with all the arrangements established
under it and this Agreement alone, which was voted on May 22,
1998. No other conditions, whether verbal or written given by
any of the parties, can override what is set out in this Agreement.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGREEMENT
Unionists regard the Belfast Agreement as a crime against
their fundamental civil liberties. Indeed, it is the distress caused
46. See id., Security 2-3.
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by the content of the Agreement that has provoked such wide-
spread alarm and division within Unionism. The proposals con-
tained in the Agreement are not remarkably new in content, but
they now have the endorsement of those who were previously
opposed to such mechanisms that will fundamentally undermine
the status of Northern Ireland within the Union and impose a
system of government so alien that it is far removed from any
known concept of democracy and fairness.
The argument against the Agreement was based upon
sound, rational thinking and is a positive opposition to some-
thing wholly negative with nothing to offer Unionism but its en-
forced destruction.
Unionists have for many generations become accustomed to
this bad-spirited attitude of the Nationalist community. It was
Lord Carson who identified similar problems with the attitude of
Nationalists when he came to lead the Unionist community dur-
ing the Home Rule crisis. He said of Nationalists in 1912:
"Ulster sees in Irish Nationalism a dark conspiracy, buttressed
upon crime and incitement to outrage maintained by ignorance
and pandering to superstition."4 7 It is correct to claim that the
content of the Agreement owes much to a conspiracy hatched
against Unionists by a great consistent movement of pan-Nation-
alism, which embraces within it gains made at the expense of law
and order, while undermining the democratic process that feeds
an unjustifiable hatred of all that is British in its expression of
identity and claim of loyalty in Ulster within the Union.
The text of the Agreement is a masterpiece of ambiguity in
parts, but on the vital issue only the most blindfolded of readers
would suggest that the Union has been endorsed and strength-
ened. This part of the Agreement establishes a "binding obliga-
tion" on the signatories to work towards a sovereign thirty-two
county Republic. No matter which way the Agreement is read,
there is, on the question of balance alone, no similar binding
obligation to reinforce or to strengthen the Union.
A. Undermining the Union
In the second section of the Agreement, called "Constitu-
tional Issues," we get right to the bone of contention, that is, the
47. PAISLEY, JR., supra note 8, at 24 (quoting Lord. Carson).
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ideological question of whether Northern Ireland is to remain
British or to become part of an all-Ireland Republic.
This section is supposed to be a replacement of and alterna-
tive to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I suspect that the Irish Gov-
ernment could not believe their fortune that the Ulster Union-
ists, instead of rejecting the Anglo-Irish process, so fully em-
braced it and through this Agreement that embellished it.
There are certain fundamental issues that must be brought
to the public's attention about this section. Other controversial
and emotional matters, such as the early release of terrorist pris-
oners, have caught the immediate attention of the public and
diverted the close and necessary study of these vital constitu-
tional issues, allowing those in the 'Yes" lobby to argue that the
Constitution is safe. The constitutional position of Northern Ire-
land could not be in more grave danger than ever before!
Northern Ireland is, according to paragraph one of the
Constitutional Issues section, without its British status. Even the
Anglo-Irish Agreement mentioned the status of Northern Ire-
land. The government wordsmiths crafted an Agreement that
uses deception to disguise this great omission. The participants
are obliged to recognize "the legitimacy of whatever choice" is
made by the people. However, previous legislation governing
this matter is clear that the status of Northern Ireland is affirmed
as a certainty, that is, it is British. The right to alter the status is a
separate commitment provided for in law. Now, the two-status
and change-are rolled into one, indicating that the status has
and will continue to change. The Britishness of Northern Ire-
land is no longer a certainty.
According to the Agreement, the uncertainty of the status of
Northern Ireland is the premium issue. Other regions are not
treated in this disrespectful manner. For example, Scotland's
place in the Union is referred to by the Government as a "Part-
nership for good." The British Government has decided to play
on the fact that the status of Northern Ireland is alterable and
Ulster's Britishness can be abandoned. The deal, however, goes
much further. It insists that once a simple majority of the peo-
ple want a change in the status of Northern Ireland, then that
change can only be in one direction and for one option-that of
a "sovereign United Ireland." The wish for Irish unity will imme-
diately be accommodated, and there will be a "binding obliga-
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tion on both governments to introduce, and support in their re-
spective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish."
In the meantime, there is no such obligation to give effect
to the wish to remain British. There is no commitment to intro-
duce legislation signifying the British status of Northern Ireland.
The "No" lobby has been continuously disparaged for failing to
introduce an alternative to the Agreement. The alternative is
glaringly obvious: strengthen the Union by governing Northern
Ireland as if it were part of the Union, not as if you wished to
abandon it!
Such pro-British policy is actively discouraged by this Deal.
It strictly prohibits the British government from using any influ-
ence to promote Britishness. The Agreement states: "It is for
the people of the Island alone, by agreement between the two
parts respectfully and without external impediments, to exercise
their right of self determination." The external impediment par-
agraph prohibits any attempt by any future British Government
actively to promote the policy of the Union. No such restrictions
are placed on successive Irish Governments. In fact, the wording
betrays the fact that the people of the whole Island will have that
say!
The rest of this section continues with the promotion of this
Irish Unity theme, explaining how a United Ireland must be
given encouragement and the right never denied. In fact, each
paragraph gives expression to this wish. It says that "a substantial
section" of the people want a United Ireland, that the govern-
ments are under a "binding obligation" to deliver a united Ire-
land, and that until such a time the British government must
show "rigorous impartiality" so that the "birthright" of the peo-
ple of Northern Ireland is one of a dual identity.
A closing sentence in the section on the Constitution in-
troduces an Annex containing the changes to legislation to ef-
fect these proposals. The Mitchell Draft text refers to "the Irish
Constitution." For the most insignificant of reasons, the UUP
objected to this terminology and secured new wording, which
appears in the final text, namely, "the constitution of Ireland."
This was not a defence of the Union as claimed; it was an object
lesson in dithering and deserting the union.
The same Annex to this section outlines the required
changes to British and Irish legislation. Here, the battle for the
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ideology is fought and won. Section 75 of the Government of
Ireland Act 1920 (or "1920 Act"), which states that the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom is sovereign over all matters in
Northern Ireland, is ditched.
This 1920 Act effectively created Northern Ireland and de-
fines the territory of the State. Yet it is part of the Agreement to
repeal this Act in its entirely. David Trimble attempted to argue
that this Act is irrelevant. However, when he stood for election
in the 1996 Forum election, he and his Party had a policy that
they would not re-negotiate the Union. In fact, his Party com-
mitted itself to the policy that the Union would not be on the
table. Now, Trimble has tried to explain away this repeal as an
irrelevancy, claiming that the 1800 Act of Union remains un-
changed, yet he fails to explain that the repeal of the 1920 Act
does not put us back in time to 1800, but brings into effect the
wording of this Agreement, which, as explained above, is far
from ambiguous about the new status of Northern Ireland. The
legal trust deeds of Northern Ireland's place in the Union have
been shamelessly surrendered.
The Leader of the Official Unionist Party, Mr. David Trim-
ble, argues that this repeal is made up for in kind by the next
part of the same Annex, mainly the proposed changes to Irish
legislation. The legislation is explicit: "Any institution estab-
lished by or under the Agreement may exercise the powers and
functions conferred on it in respect of all or any part of the Is-
land." It is clear that new legislation will give effect to the Re-
public's illegal claim to Northern Ireland. The deal provides the
mechanism for all-Ireland rule. Yet again, the original Mitchell
text indicates no changes of substance to these important mat-
ters.
David Trimble boasts that the illegal territorial claim of sov-
ereignty over Northern Ireland has been "surrendered." Noth-
ing could be further from the truth. Trimble agreed to the re-
peal of the 1920 Act; to cover his tracks he has had to misrepre-
sent what he got in return, and his misrepresentations have been
massive.
The new wording for Articles 2 and 3 substitutes the claim
over territory for a new claim over "every person born in the
Island." The fact that the claim is both over the people and the
place where the people reside, namely the "Island," is not a re-
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moval of the claim at all but a rewritten claim. On first reading
one could suppose that the Irish Constitution is amended to re-
move the claim and to replace it with an aspiration. That is not
so. The claim is amplified, not amended.
The Agreement damages the Union in the following ways.
First, it ensures that Northern Ireland Unionists will in future be
under-represented in the North-South Body. Unionists will al-
ways be accompanied by a Nationalist. Given the agreed cross-
community rule, the veto remains with Sinn Fain/IRA and the
SDLP.
Second, the Agreement provides that any Minister who at-
tends the North-South body has the competence to take execu-
tive decisions effecting his department without reference back to
the Assembly. Reference back only occurs if another depart-
ment is affected and that Minister is not in attendance. The As-
sembly only becomes accountable only when a Minister not in
attendance at the North-South 'Council is required to be present.
Third, it establishes all-Ireland 'implementation bodies
charged with putting the policies into practice. These bodies im-
plement on "an all-Ireland basis."
Fourth, the Agreement creates a new all-Ireland joint civil
service drawn from the existing Northern Ireland Office, and
the Irish office will be the support group to ensure the smooth
implementation of any decision. The Official Unionist Party's
claim that the Maryfield Secretariat has gone is simply not true.
Fifth, this agreement stipulates that the Assembly and the
Irish Parliament will bring together an all-Ireland Parliamentary
body. This is a continuation of the Inter-Parliamentary body es-
tablished by the Anglo-Irish Agreement and for the past thirteen
years boycotted by the Official Unionist Party but now accepted
by that party.
Finally, it secures an interfering role for the Irish govern-
ment in Northern Ireland's rural development, teacher training,
tourism, higher education, fisheries, road and rail issues, physi-
cal planning, animal health, and European programs, as well as
establishing an all-Ireland body to promote the Irish language.
All of these measures are against the electoral commitments
given by the Official Unionist Party at the last three elections.
The Ulster Unionist Council's Statement of Aims published in
November 1995, states that in its relationship with the Irish Re-
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public the party seeks a one that "preserves the political inde-
pendence and territorial integrity" of Northern Ireland. Clearly,
the Official Unionist Party failed to stand by this principle.
The Ulster Democratic Unionist Party obtained a copy of
the Mitchell paper known as the "Draft Paper for Discussion."
This was the basis upon which the Belfast Agreement was negoti-
ated. It was produced as an aid to participants amid much pub-
lic drama played out at Stormont Castle Buildings by Sen.
George Mitchell, the Chairman of the multi-party talks, in the
days immediately before the deal was agreed. Senator Mitchell,
in a public statement before the deal, warned that the publica-
tion of the document would be regarded by him as "dangerous."
B. Undemocratic Institutions
The institutions proposed in the Agreement are its sub-
stance. Three new institutions are proposed: an Assembly, a
North/South Council, and a British-Irish Council including a
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.
The institutions are, in the Agreement's own words, "so
closely inter-related that the success of each depends on that of
the other." In other words, they are as one. The Irish legislation
amplifies the functions as all-Ireland and the proposals spelling
out how these all-Ireland bodies with "executive powers" are to
function. At the time of the Referendum, the Leader of the Of-
ficial Unionist Party wrote an open letter to electors containing
the lie that the institutions would not have executive powers.
Unionists have long demonstrated their commitment to
democratic means. They believe in the sovereignty of the ballot
box and reject the bullet, which plays no part in their identity.
They have proved this despite the most intense provocation. De-
mocracy is a fundamental principle for Unionists. That princi-
plehas been secured by the might of the Unionist vote. It is the
democratic wish of the majority of people in Northern Ireland to
remain part of the Union. Only the most perverse mind would
throw away that strength. Yet, the Agreement does exactly that.
With the hands of Delilah, the Samson bonds of strength, that of
a majority vote, have been rendered helpless by this deal that
cuts off that vital cord and renders the majority vote in Northern
Ireland useless.
Some commentators wrongly compare the political situa-
PEACE AGREEMENT-OR LAST PIECE?
tion in Northern Ireland with the politics and conflict in South
Africa, making all manner of vulgar and naive comparisons be-
tween certain political leaders here and there and claiming that
a solution based upon the South African model ought to apply
to Northern Ireland. The ironic thing is if these people actually
thought about what they were saying, they would not make such
irrelevant comparisons.
Republicans wrongly lay claim to being a suppressed peo-
ple. Yet they have, by supporting this Agreement, committed
themselves to a system of government that will guarantee the
suppression of democratic rights in Northern Ireland. Republi-
cans reject majority rule, falsely claiming that it is a contrived
majority. Those Unionists who have wandered into the "Yes"
lobby reject majority rule also. Their sole interest is in a system
that can gain the support of John Hume and Gerry Adams. So
much for the so-called Unionist veto! This Agreement actually
establishes and enshrines a Nationalist veto.
Those same commentators suggest that the model of South
Africa should apply to Northern Ireland. In the weeks immedi-
ately after the deal, both Unionists and Republicans accompa-
nied senior ANC figures around the Province. However, anyone
who has taken the time to study the political infrastructure of the
new South Africa will discover that majority rule is a fundamen-
tal principle there. In fact, Nelson Mandela paid this tribute to
the principle of majority rule in his autobiography. He wrote:
"Majority rule and internal peace are like the two sides of a sin-
gle coin and white South Africa simply has to accept that there
will never be peace and stability in this country until the princi-
ple is fully applied."
The principle is one of the few common denominators that
should be transposed from that country to this one. Republicans
in Northern Ireland must recognize the legitimacy of majority
rule. Unionists accept that until that is so there is little prospect
of internal peace. The deal is the abandonment of the principle
and as a result makes democracy and, importantly, real peace
less obtainable than ever before.
1. The Assembly
The Agreement establishes a 108-member Assembly for
Northern Ireland with both legislative and administrative pow-
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ers. It will effectively take on the work and responsibilities cur-
rently exercised by the six Northern Ireland Office departments.
The Assembly is a unique cross-community model. Under the
heading "Safeguards," IRA/Sinn Fein delegates are guaranteed a
place in the decision-making part of the Assembly. No party can
be excluded by the model. In fact, the allocation of Committee
Chairmanships, Ministerial office, and Committee membership
is not the patronage of one party over the other, but is estab-
lished as of right to all parties before any vote is cast in any elec-
tion. Further, no party can be excluded from executive power
unless there is cross-community vote in the Assembly to deprive
a party of its place. There is no prospect of the SDLP or Sinn
F~in voting to exclude each other from executive power.
The naive may muse that this is a wonderful model of cross-
community harmony. In reality, they could not be further from
the truth. The Assembly actively precludes any concept of nor-
mal political participation. It is designed to placate IRA/Sinn
Fain and bears little prospect of delivering a sensible approach
to how we should be governed.
Outspoken UUP Member of Parliament William Ross has
stated publicly and written several newspaper articles declaring
his opposition to the model and stating that those who agree
with the proposal have not thought of what he calls the "down-
stream" problems. He is correct to point out these immediate
difficulties. The Assembly actively prevents normal democratic
politics from taking place.
Normally, one would expect a party aspiring to government
to propose a manifesto to the electorate and, if they achieve a
mandate, to implement those policies. Under this deal, a major-
ity party cannot carry out one single manifesto commitment be-
cause no single party will have the authority to change legislation
in such a straightforward manner. Voting for a manifesto com-
mitment will become an irrelevancy. Instead of normalizing
politics, the Agreement is designed to secure the opposite-the
permanent destruction of accountability.
The Assembly will not be in the control of the party with the
majority of votes, but will be in the control of the Nationalist
community. Effectively, David Trimble has agreed to an Assem-
bly that will permit nothing to pass into legislation without the
approval of Gerry Adams! This rigged formula was the only way
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the SDLP and IRA/Sinn Fin were going to accept an assembly
model. Nationalists are satisfied because they have a veto in the
Assembly. The contrast with their previous false allegation of a
"Unionist veto," which was in reality parliamentary democracy, is
therefore the height of hypocrisy.
2. The Mechanism of "Parallel Consent"
The Agreement establishes a mechanism known as "parallel
consent." This mechanism provides for decisions to be reached
on a cross-community basis. That means that any motion that is
passed must secure the majority of Unionist and the majority of
Nationalist votes. Proposed legislation can be prevented from
passage simply by the Nationalists' withholding support. This
mechanism institutionalizes forever the sectarian divisions in
Northern Ireland. This is a recipe for political stalemate, not a
solution!
All important matters including the budget will be dealt
with in this manner. But this is not the only chain restraining
democracy. Nationalists have a second option: they can prevent
any measure from passage by issuing a "petition of concern,"
which requires only thirty signatories.
The downstream consequences are mammoth. The Assem-
bly may have a majority of Unionists elected to it, but their votes
are rendered largely meaningless because of the mechanisms
that permit Nationalist members to veto progress. The Commit-
tees and Ministers that will replace the current NIO Ministers as
Heads of Departments, will be allocated on proportion to those
parties elected to the Assembly. IRA/Sinn Fain will receive be-
tween ten percent and fifteen percent of all committee places
and Ministerial position. In effect, Minister Gerry Adams, Minis-
ter Martin McGuinness, or Minister Mitchell McLoughlin will be
directing operations in government departments in Northern
Ireland.
If, for example, they are in charge of the Department of
Education, they will decide to which schools tax-payers money
will be allocated. Under the current mechanism, the Govern-
ment has just announced its intention to spend £30 million on
schools in Ulster. Over £26 million went to the Roman Catholic-
maintained sector in order to placate Nationalist demands. How
much more will a government structure tailor-made to appease
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Republicanism be unbalanced in its allocation of resources
across Northern Ireland? This is just one minor downstream ex-
ample of how this Assembly will create problems, not resolve
them!
. This Agreement will hamper democracy in that not one sin-
gle decision affecting the people of Northern Ireland will be
taken without the express approval of Hume and Adams. It is a
recipe for administrative disaster. Only the strongest possible
Unionist team could have any prospect of denting the National-
ist monolith in such an Assembly. The Nationalist veto will de-
mand that only moderate or pliable unionists will have Ministe-
rial function because only the most conciliating Unionists will
have Nationalist approval. Yet, Unionists boast that this very As-
sembly is good for the Union. David Trimble claims it is the
"best deal possible" and will strengthen the Union. There is
nothing in this Assembly that can strengthen the Union. Even
Unionists like Ken Maginnis agree that Mr. Trimble's proposals
are "the worst example of snouts in the trough costing the tax-
payer over £90 million for four unnecessary Departments of Gov-
ernment."
If this deal is bad, it is even more insulting when one consid-
ers its blueprint, the Mitchell draft. In the words of John Taylor:
"I wouldn't touch it with a forty-foot barge poll." Yet the Mitch-
ell draft shows that the Official Unionist Party did not achieve
any significant alterations. We have only their word for it that
the proposals were unacceptable in their original format be-
cause in the final version they remain identical.
It is this part of the author's copy of the Mitchell draft that
becomes interesting. The key negotiator whose copy the author
has obtained has his objections pencilled in on the margins. On
over twenty separate occasions he has written at key paragraphs:
"We lost out here," or "UUP loss." This anecdote gives an in-
sight into the mind of the UUP throughout the seventy-two hour
negotiating process. On every key issue the UUP lost the battle
and-conceded to Republicanism.
They were warned from day one that this would be the case.
They were told that the outcome was predetermined and that
their presence was a veneer. They protested that they would not
leave, but if the proposals were unacceptable, they would not
agree to the outcome. As it transpired, the proposals are not
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acceptable, are described as a "UUP loss," yet now they are ac-
cepted. Effectively, the UUP team has caught out the opposition
by surrendering!
According to the author's copy of the Mitchell draft, the
UUP lost out on the number of seats for each of the eighteen
constituencies, on the issues that the parallel consensus mecha-
nism should be applied, on the party from which the Chair of
the Assembly should come, on the sharing out of committee
posts, on where executive authority ought to be vested, on the
content of the pledge of office, and on the status of the Execu-
tive Committee. This text is a charter of UUP failure and not a
UUP success story.
The public should think about the sort of Assembly that is
about to emerge from these proposals. The First Minister and
Deputy First Minister are appointed together as political Siamese
twins. Then up to ten Ministers will be appointed. However, the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister cannot be appointed
without the approval of the majority of Nationalists endorsing
the choice. In theory, if the largest Unionist Party in the country
elected to the Assembly is not to the liking of the Nationalist
members, it has no prospect of providing a First Minister. Only
the most pliable of Unionists will be accepted for office.
Every Minister has to affirm a Pledge of Office. This is an
oath to work and to "participate with colleagues," including Sinn
Fgin/IRA. This part of the negotiations was the competency of
Reg Empey. He agreed to the notion of having IRA "colleagues"
in government and pledging collective loyalty with them and to
them. It is clear that John Taylor's forty-foot barge poll very
quickly became a mere toothpick of resistance!
The powers of the SDLP and IRA/Sinn Fain Ministers are
extended to include all-Ireland executive authority. These mem-
bers will have the authority to represent the Assembly at "summit
level" in other institutions. Those who argue that the Assembly
will corral IRA/Sinn Fain are gravely mistaken. This is a point
recognized by the Unionist negotiator who wrote on the Mitch-
ell draft below the draft paragraph 30 that "it has been extended
in paragraph 35 of the final paper in an attempt to exclude S.F.
and it won't [sic] do so!" Here is the confession in the hand-
writing of the negotiator that the subsequent claims that Sinn
F~in will be excluded from executive authority is not so.
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Since the publication of the final agreement, David Trimble
has been at pains to claim that he has assurances from the Prime
Minister that those parties that hold on to the means of violence
will be excluded from executive authority. In the UUP publica-
tion Ulster Unionists [sic] Say Yes, David Trimble claims: "No un-
reformed terrorists in government. The Agreement provides
that any parties which have not begun decommissioning will be
excluded and removed from Ministerial Executive of the Assem-
bly when it comes into full operation."48 This is completely un-
true. If it was the case, why did Gerry Adams congratulate David
Trimble when he got the Agreement through the Ulster Union-
ist Council, with the words "Well done, David!"? IRA/Sinn F~in
have negotiated an Agreement that includes them in govern-
ment as of right and Trimble knows this to be so. The IRA has
pronounced that there will be .no decommissioning of IRA weap-
ons. The Agreement does not enforce the surrender of weap-
ons; it is simply an option.
3. The Institutionalization of Dublin Interference
The Official Unionist Party has claimed that the Assembly
will have primacy and that the North-South bodies will be minor
powerless organizations. This too is untrue. According to the
Agreement, the Assembly is without legislative or administrative
power until it pushes the start button for the all-Ireland North-
South bodies to commence work. The UUP is saying "yes" to
Gerry Adams in government over Northern Ireland, to a Nation-
alist veto over the Assembly, and to powerful all Ireland govern-
ment structure.
The Agreement proposes a North/South Ministerial Coun-
cil. This will be a powerful all-Ireland executive described by Pe-
ter Robinson MP as all-Ireland parliament in "embryo form."
The all-Ireland body is compulsory and is not, as David Trimble
claims, a "consultation only" body. The fact that those Unionists
who are for the deal must lie about what they have signed up to
is an indication that they know they have done the wrong thing
by accepting it.
The UUP claims the deal is the "death of the Framework
Document" and that the "Maryfield Secretariat will go." None of
these claims are true. The North-South body will have full exec-
48. Id. at 30 (quoting David Trimble).
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utive powers and functions. The powers envisaged are, in fact,
far greater than those proposed in the Framework Documents.
In the Framework Documents, the powers were descried as "con-
sultation, harmonisation and executive." In the Agreement they
are described as those of "consultative, co-operation and action."
The Irish Government voted to amend its constitution to include
the power of "executive authority" over the Island as a result of
the Agreement. This is one change to the Irish Constitution that
the "Yes" Unionists did not comment upon, and when the truth
is told, the so-called "change" did nothing more than substitute a
claim of nationality for a claim of territory and jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction, far from being quashed, is actually implemented
and strengthened through this Agreement.
The UUP claims that the Agreement is "no Sunningdale."
Their basis for the claim is not the legislation, but an interpreta-
tion given to the document by a Sunday newspaper columnist. If
this is what the UUP are placing their faith upon, then God help
Ulster! The proposals are more powerful than Sunningdale,
more full-blooded that the Framework Document, and far worse
than the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It is the intention that this all-
Ireland body will develop into all-Ireland government.
Once again, a comparison between the final version of the
deal and the Mitchell draft shows that very few amendments
were made. The author's copy, with the unnamed negotiator's
handwriting upon it, identifies a number of areas where the
UUP team lost out. This part of the negotiations was the respon-
sibility of John Taylor MP.
4. The British-Irish Council
Hailed as a major success story by the UUP, the British-Irish
Council is nothing more than a revamped Anglo-Irish Council.
What was previously overwhelmingly rejected by Unionists in
.1985 is now falsely portrayed and rejoiced in as a Unionist vic-
tory. The British-Irish Council is at best, for Unionism, a lunch-
eon club, but at worst it is a council where the two Governments
will continue to interfere in the affairs of Northern Ireland over
the heads of the people of the Province. The British-Irish In-
terparliamentary Body is enhanced, and the British and Irish
civil service staff, previously at Maryfield, will continue to carry
out the functions of this body.
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This show window is nothing more than a disguise for the
real purpose of this body. In this section of the deal, the British-
Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which was the most contro-
versial aspect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, continues to oper-
ate with enhanced powers. Garret FitzGerald, who signed the
Hillsborough Agreement, claimed that the intended purpose of
that conference was to be in full glare of the public to demon-
strate that Dublin was playing a meaningful role. However, the
massive public disapproval of the Conference forced it to oper-
ate out of Maryfield in what Fitzgerald described as "monastic
seclusion."
By contrast, the Good Friday deal moves the Maryfield Sec-
retariat to the heart of administration in Stormont, with the ap-
proval of John Taylor. Effectively, Stormont Castle and Parlia-
ment Buildings will be jointly managed by Dublin and Belfast
civil servants. The powers of this Secretariat will be more full-
blooded than anything to which the previous Conference had
access. According to the Agreement, the Secretariat will deal
with "non-devolved" matters. Westminster is sidelined for a
Council, which the Assembly cannot control either, because the
issues under its competence are non-devolved matters clearly
outside the remit of the Assembly.
The Mitchell draft shows that a key safeguard that gave the
"Northern Ireland administration advance notice" of conference
activities was removed.
Various new quangos are proposed throughout this section,
including a Northern Ireland Civic Forum drawn presumably
from all those parties and community groups that cannot get
elected by democratic means, a North-South Forum, a Human
Rights Commission, and an Equality Commission. All these
commissions are wholly unrepresentative, removing democratic
accountability from elected representatives and providing a plat-
form for unelectable spokesmen, and were described by the
UUP negotiator on the Mitchell Draft as "very bad and very
widely drafted and dangerous."
IV. THE CONTROVERSY OF THE DEAL
Over the whole scene hangs the dark cloud of IRA/Sinn
Fin-as strong, as armed, as unreconciled to peace as in the
past and, perhaps, freer than ever. No, these are not good days
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for the Union.49
David Trimble has had the audacity to describe the deal in
glowing terms, declaring it is "as good as it gets." Constitution-
ally, it is the mechanism to take Northern Ireland out of the
Union. Politically, it is a vindication for the provisional IRA, and
controversially, it is a reward to terrorists.
Three weeks after the deal was made, at a secluded and un-
disclosed location in Co. Antrim, members of the UFF and UDA
met with the press. There, in scenes reminiscent of some third
world terrorist regime, the UFF and UDA issued a statement of
endorsement of the Good Friday deal. Their statement claimed
that they could endorse the Agreement and they consequently
recommended a "Yes" vote in the referendum held on May 22.
Ironically, they appealed to IRA/Sinn F~in to side with them and
back the deal.
The television pictures portrayed hooded gangsters and kill-
ers, sitting at a table with copies of the Agreement strewn across
it. Beside the Agreement lay two pistols, taking on the duty of
paper weights for the occasion. If ever the phrase "A picture
tells a thousand words" was proved to be true, it was here!
Loyalist terrorists have not for the first time mimicked the
actions of Republicans. At the IRA/Sinn F~in conference in the
week following publication of the Agreement, Gerry Adams
spelled out that the IRA accepted the deal. He went on publicly
to congratulate David Trimble for gaining the endorsement of
the Party's ruling council with the words: "Well done, David."
It became clear that those in the "Yes" campaign had the
support of the terrorists, and the Agreement spelled out exactly
why these armed gangs' support for the deal was forthcoming.
The Agreement is a vindication of the abhorrent principle that violence
pays. It validated the position of those who engaged in terrorism
over the past thirty years and is a victory for the IRA. The fact is:
this deal is a victory for terrorism. The strategy of the IRA and
the long-term goal of the IRA remain, while Northern Ireland
remains on the trajectory of the political course dictated by the
IRA. Their strategy has not been undermined.
Some time ago the IRA outlined that its campaign was
about the "tactical use of the armed struggle," that it would use
49. Id. at 29 (quoted from Daily Telegraph).
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politics to pursue its goals and at the same time engage in terror-
ism to pursue its goals. The IRA has become, over the past thirty
years, not only the most advanced terrorist organization the
world has ever known, but also the most flexible. Like a chame-
leon, the IRA can change from active terror to peace movement
and back to terrorism. Their view of the deal is not that of a
final chapter in a long saga, but just another phase in the strug-
gle. Gerry Adams, speaking a few days after the deal was made at
an IRA rally in Belfast, said: "This struggle continues and will
continue until the British army are out of our country, until par-
tition is ended. We want freedom, demilitarisation, the equality
agenda, the release of all the political prisoners."5°
During the negotiations, David Trimble declared that such
demands by Adams were nothing more than a "Republican wish
list," that he wanted to move on with the SDLP and to negotiate
on real issues. However, the deal that David Trimble now fully
endorses grants the demands on the IRA's "wish list." This part
of the Agreement has come to represent the most pernicious
aspect of the deal.
A. Decommissioning
When the talks process commenced, IRA/Sinn Fain were
excluded because they were not observing a ceasefire and be-
cause the Government had made it clear that decommissioning
of terrorist weapons was a necessity. It would take a separate
publication to outline the much feted history of decommission-
ing; suffice it to say that the Governments abandoned previous
statements, fluctuating from complete decommissioning of all
terrorist weapons, to some decommissioning, to no decommis-
sioning. This agreement is good for all terrorists because it
wipes out any need for the handing over of illegal terrorist weap-
ons.
The Agreement is at variance with previously given commit-
ments made by Unionists and Nationalists alike. At the start of
the process, a line of Nationalist leaders declared that the pro-
cess was about "getting the gun out of Irish politics"-that the
IRA could not put aside their weapons for an experimental pe-
riod and then go back to them.
50. Id. at 33 (quoting Gerry Adams).
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David Trimble declared that he would "stop the talks if
decommissioning does not start right away." On September 2,
1997, David Trimble and Ian Paisley issued a joint communique
stating: "Our two parties are also agreed that the issue of decom-
missioning, the handing over of illegal terrorist weaponry, must
be resolved to their satisfaction before there could be substantive
political negotiations."51 The DUP held to this pledge. It is with
regret that the UUP abandoned it within days.
This Good Friday deal actively prevents the decommissioning
of terrorist weapons. In fact, there is not the remote possibility
of the IRA's handing over its weapons. Time and time again the
IRA leadership has emphatically made this position clear. Three
weeks after the deal the IRA reaffirmed its position that it will
not decommission, and it has reiterated this position several
times since then. The irony is that the only weapons to have
been decommissioned were in the possession of a paramilitary
group opposed to the deal!
Only David Trimble believes there will be decommissioning
as a result of the deal. Yet in the UUP publication Ulster Unionists
Say Yes, there is no mention whatsoever of the decommissioning
issue. One would have thought that if the UUP believed that
this issue was secured, the Party would promote the gain. One
glib reference is made to active terrorism when it claims that the
"agreement provides that any parties which have not begun
decommissioning will be excluded and removed from Ministe-
rial Executive of the Assembly" is, according to one negotiator, a
blatant lie. There is no such provision.
David Trimble has been dashing from television studio to
television studio like a reincarnation of Austin Chamberlain wav-
ing a piece of paper from the Prime Minister, claiming it repre-
sents a Government commitment to enact legislation to bring
about this result. Yet the commitment is meaningless. The
Agreement to which Trimble is committed has no such provision
for the unilateral amendment by way of a letter from Tony Blair,
just as it as no commitment to decommissioning.
The skimpy section on weapons, running to less than 200
words, merely seeks from participants an intention to work on
the issue, to bring the matter to the attention of paramilitary
51. Id. at 33 (quoting joint statement issued by David Trimble and Ian Paisley).
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groups, and to use their "influence" to convince those terrorists
that decommissioning should happen.
The Deal states that decommissioning is conditional upon
"the implementation of the overall settlement." That means that
the IRA must be continuously appeased to their satisfaction.
Given that terrorists have achieved so much with their weapons
and with the threat of them, there is no prospect of their decom-
missioning to anyone.
The SDLP LeaderJohn Hume endorses the IRA's stance on
decommissioning. In an interview on BBC Radio 4 on April 13,
1998, he stated that the IRA would be reluctant to comply, and
on the question of handing over guns, he said: "You are into a
psychological matter in Northern Ireland terms of being seen to
surrender to one side."5 2 The fact is, decommissioning is the
only physical evidence that the terrorists are serious about peace.
Their reluctance to decommission one bullet since 1994 is evi-
dence of their reluctance to commit themselves to peace and is a
warning to the rest of us not to trust them. Since 1999 they have
retracted their "no decommissioning" stance.
Those who have foolishly conditioned their support for the
Agreement on the basis that if decommissioning does not take
place, they will withdraw their support, will find that they are too
late. There are no U-turns permitted under the referendum.
There is no concession by terrorists to the democratic process.
There are only concessions by democracy to terrorism!
B. "Demilitarisation"
On the further issue of what IRA/Sinn Fin calls the
"demilitarisation" agenda, there are significant gains for the IRA.
The Deal commits the British government to the "reduction of
the numbers of the Armed Forces" and the "removal of security
installations," i.e., "Brits out!" The British military machine has
begun to run down its armed forces in Northern Ireland over
the next three years as part of this peace Deal.
David Trimble has mistaken fair words for concrete actions.
The only things that will actually be done are all things detri-
mental to the British position. Under what should effectively be
called 'Security for Terrorists,' Army surveillance installations
52. Id. at 34 (quoting John Hume).
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have been dismantled, Army numbers reduced, and emergency
powers removed.
The entire tenor of the Agreement is change in one direc-
tion only. It is clear that significant changes are envisaged for
the Royal Ulster Constabulary as well. The loosely-worded aspi-
rations about new beginnings and a fresh start sit against direct
and concrete commitments on the issue of policing. For in-
stance, there is a commitment to an "unarmed" police, to a ser-
vice that will attract the allegiance and membership of those
from the terrorist section of the community. In order to achieve
the aims and objectives for the RUC, the deal establishes an In-
dependent Commission to make recommendations about the fu-
ture policing arrangements. This Commission, chaired by for-
mer Governor of Hong Kong Chris Patten, is international in
make-up and obliged to report its recommendations by the sum-
mer of 1999.
The terms of reference for this Commission include bring-
ing forward proposals that will significantly reform the RUC and
bring it to a "transition to policing a peaceful society." The tran-
sition is spelled out as including changes to recruitment, compo-
sition, training, cultural ethos, and symbols. Importantly, the
police force is to be restructured so that the "police service"-
not the RUC, which is mentioned only once in the entire docu-
ment in the past tense-is delivered in "inclusive partnerships
with the community at all levels with the maximum delegation."
This is the restructuring of the RUC into a two-tier service.
It is exactly what the SDLP called for and it appeases the ter-
rorists. Alex Aitwood, a minor functionary within the SDLP, told
the press that the Agreement would deliver a "police service un-
recognisable from the RUC."53 Effectively, the RUC will become
a community service that incorporates ex-terrorists and others in
the dispensing of justice within their communities. David Trim-
ble said before he signed the Agreement that it put "terrorists
into police Uniforms." Given that there is no significant change
to the final format of the Agreement from the Mitchell Draft
Agreement, he has signed up to that very concept.
Sir Ronnie Flannigan, the Chief Constable of the RUC, has
rejected the Independent Commission and dismissed the two-
tier policing structure outlined in the deal. However, there is
53. Id. at 35 (quoting Alex Attwood).
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nothing he can do to halt the changes. In a public statement
about the Commission, he said: "It is not something I would
welcome as I don't see it as designed as having a primary objec-
tive of improving the policing service. It is designed for a polit-
ical purpose .... ,
He criticized the two-tier police concept, claiming it would
run the risk of helping the IRA and loyalist groups to supplant
the RUC. His outspoken remarks will fail to save the RUC. It is
clear that he was speaking an oration at the funeral service of the
RUC and he is effectively the last Chief Constable of the RUC as
we know it.
A total of 299 RUC officers have been murdered during the
troubles. The IRA has killed 277, the INLA and IPLO 12, and
loyalist terrorists seven. Three were murdered by unknown
groups. Eight-thousand, three-hundred twenty-six have been in-
jured during the course of their duties by terrorist attacks. Ter-
rorist groups have bombed, shot, and beaten RUC men to death,
sometimes killing other relatives and civilians in the process.
The RUC is a force of dedicated and gallant servicemen and wo-
men. It has protected the entire community with impartiality
and professionalism. It is an irreplaceable force and has been
the bulwark between chaos and. order.
The Republican movement has consistently targeted it, not
because of its make-up or name but because of its loyalty. The
Blair Government has forgotten the price of that loyalty because
the cost of this deal, for this and future governments, will be
massive. No reform of the RUC will appease terrorism; its very
existence is the primary objection. The Good Friday deal is a
bad deal for the police and a devastation of a police service to
the advantage of the IRA.
The Agreement contains no condemnation of terrorism. It
fails to mention that the terrorist threat remains unchanged.
The Chief Constable has identified the IRA as the main obstacle
to peace in Northern Ireland, yet the deal moves full speed
ahead with radical proposals that will undermine law and order
in the Province. According to the Chief Constable, "the IRA
continues to be intact, to have access to the means of engaging
in terrorist activities and therefore they continue to pose a
54. Id. at 34 (quoting Sir Ronnie Flannigan).
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threat."55 Yet the deal that David Trimble has signed up to iden-
tifies the RUC as the organization that will change fundamen-
tally, not the terrorists.
The Republican wish list, including demilitarisation (clumsy
code language for "Brits out" and no decommissioning), has
been conceded. The equality agenda, meaning reverse discrimi-
nation, the imposition of the Irish culture and language, and the
simultaneous removal of the symbols of British identity have
been granted.
C. The Release of Terrorist Prisoners
The continual and ever accelerating release of IRA prison-
ers has already resulted from the terms of the Agreement. Over
the past two years, scores of prisoners have been set free on the
pretence of a peace process. Previous promises that any breach
in the cease-fire would mean the released prisoners would be
rounded up have been untrue.
The IRA's cease-fire has been breached on numerous occa-
sions with no impact on the prisoners issue. The Agreement al-
lows for the release of prisoners so that by the year 2000 the jails
of Northern Ireland will be empty. Little wonder Adams told a
Republican Rally in North Belfast: "We are sticking with this."
On August 15, in Omagh, Irish Republican terrorists perpe-
trated the bloodiest, vilest, and most cowardly massacre of inno-
cent men, women and children in the last thirty years of North-
ern Ireland's history. In their relentless campaign of terror
aimed at foisting their ideals on the Unionist majority, they
slaughtered with one foul stroke almost thirty human beings, in-
cluding unborn babies in their mother's womb, and maimed
over three hundred. Their dastardly tactic was to lure their vic-
tims into the very center of the bomb blast by deliberately giving
a false warning about its location.
This mindless atrocity carried out by Irish Nationalist fanat-
ics is the fruit of three decades of appeasement of their Republi-
can agenda. The endless string of capitulation to the bomb and
the bullet; the progressive betrayal of democracy in Northern
Ireland since the Anglo-Irish Agreement; the campaign of misin-
formation and deceit by the NIO and the media; the duplicity
55. Id. at 36 (quoting Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constabulary, Sir Ronald
Flanagan).
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and impotence of the Official Unionist Party; the final ignominy
of the Government's defection to the enemy's camp at Drum-
cree symbolizing the shameless abandonment of the civil and
political liberties of British fellow-citizens-all these factors have
been the inevitable outcome of the inept policies pursued by
successive British Governments. What they have sown they have
now begun to reap, and it is the people of Northern Ireland who
are reaping the whirlwind.
Having ignored all past warnings-together with all the vin-
dication-that the "peace process" was a tactic and a fake, Mr.
Blair's Government now incredibly continues its obstinate pur-
suit of the selfsame agenda, attempting to extricate itself from its
own mess by continuing to believe the lie that a "peace" process
exists. The "peace process" is the violence and the violence is
the peace process. The concessions that hold it in place have
bred the violence, and the violence will continue to thrive on the
concessions simply because no compromise can ever satisfy Re-
publican ideals. Violence is not assuaged by concessions to a
false peace process; it is generated and cultivated by them. This
Government must therefore be exposed as bearing ultimate re-
sponsibility for the violence, death, and suffering perpetrated in
Omagh.
Sir Winston Churchill said: "An appeaser is one who feeds a
crocodile, hoping it will eat him last."56 The American newscaster
Edward R. Murrow said: "No one can terrorise a whole nation, unless
we are all his accomplices. "" Like all those who consort with and
shake the blood-stained hands of terrorists, this Government and
its Ministers are accomplices who have the blood of the Ulster
people on their hands.
Unrepentant and unreformed terrorist murderers are al-
ready being released. If the Omagh bombing could take place
even before the prison floodgate has been opened, what can the
people of Northern Ireland expect when all the murderers and
wreckers are finally released onto our streets to return to their
intact stockpiles of weaponry and deploy them when events do
not move in the direction that they desire?
The fact is that if decommissioning had not been shelved
and IRA/Sinn F~in had been forced to surrender its weapons
56. READER'S DIGEST (Dec. 1954) (quoting Sir Winston Churchill).
57. See It Now (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 7, 1954).
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and explosives, the Omagh atrocity could not have occurred. By
the same token, if the precipitation of concessions by the Gov-
ernment had not included the dismantling of security, the
butchery and grief at Omagh would have been avoided.
The gains for the IRA are tangible. Their supporters must
be laughing at the inept behavior of those Unionists and so-
called loyalists who have "engaged" with them in a project of en-
couraging the political suicide of the Unionist people.
D. Discrimination Against Protestants
The equality agenda is a euphemism for Republican
supremacy. The deal outlines exactly how that supremacy is to
be achieved. Far from being a charter of tolerance, this is a char-
ter to reward terrorists. Look at the provisions made to en-
courage the Republican community. Provisions have been
designed to produce reverse discrimination against the Protes-
tant community on a massive scale.
Unfair preference is to be given to the Irish language-a
language hijacked by the provisional IRA and spoken only by a
minority of the minority community. The deal signs the British
Government up to a commitment to "take resolute action to pro-
mote the language" and to "facilitate and encourage the use of
the language in speech and writing in public and private life."
So much for freedom of conscience. Legislation will be brought
in to encourage developments in "private life."
For years the Irish language has been a tool at the cutting
edge of discrimination against Protestants in the Republic of Ire-
land. A language of no merit, it is a weapon of cultural abuse
with no outside use or quality; yet special place is to be afforded
to this language. In the Republic, the Irish government used the
language as a mark of identity to keep Protestants out of public
sector employment. Today, that same tactic is now to be intro-
duced into Northern Ireland, which will effectively lead to signs
going up all around the country "Irish Language only-Protes-
tants need not apply!"
Massive education funding is to be allocated to the spread
of this cultural weapon. This will lead to a reduction in educa-
tional provision for the majority community in favor of sectarian
Roman Catholic schools. Yet again, sectarianism is encouraged
by this deal, not eradicated.
13171999]
1318 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1273
New Labour's new discrimination is set to permeate all as-
pects of life. "Rapid progress" towards a regional development
strategy that "tackles the problems of a divided society" is an-
other nod-nod, wink-wink indication that the Republican com-
munity will get economic advantages as a result of this Agree-
ment. In fact, Brendan McKenna, the leader of the illegal pro-
test on the Garvaghy Road in Portadown, has been offered £15
million by the British Government in a deal for his community
to accept peace.
This new deal is to be open to all including former ter-
rorists. It pledges that it will review "the national security as-
pects" of legislation to permit "more focussed targeting social
need" programs that will "eliminate the differential in unem-
ployment rates between the two communities."
This jobs-for-the-boys program will put Protestants out of
work in the name of peace. It will ensure that former terrorists
and specially released prisoners have more rights than the rest of
the community.
V. TERRORISM WADICATED
The talks process that led to the Agreement has rightly been
described as a vindication of terrorism. No other single issue
justifies this position as the proposals on prisoners as contained
in the Agreement. For the past thirty years, successive British
Governments have argued the case that there are no political
prisoners in Northern Ireland, that the troubles were not a war
but a domestic terrorist problem, and that prisoners would have
to serve sentences commensurate with the crimes that they com-
mitted. This Agreement abandons those previously held princi-
ples.
The Agreement recognizes the part that prisoners have
played both in the so-called peace process and in the Agreement
and commits the government to put in place mechanisms for an
"accelerated program for the release of prisoners." This deal dis-
regards the justice system and any notion of due process and the
rule of law. In setting an intended target for the release of all
prisoners, the Agreement effectively grants them an amnesty.
This Agreement is a reprehensible deal. It is an insult to the
victims of terrorism and is a two-fingered salute to the demo-
cratic community of Northern Ireland. Little wonder the IRA
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rejoiced in the deal and the UFF called on their one-time ene-
mies to embrace it. It allows for the throwing open of our jails,
for the replenishing of the ranks of the terrorist organizations,
and for the strengthening of the IRA. The Daily Telegraph rightly
commented: "Over the whole scene hangs the dark cloud of
Sinn Fain/IRA - as strong, as armed, as unreconciled to peace as
in the past and, perhaps, freer than ever. No, these are not good
days for the Union."5
58. PAISLEY, JR., supra note 8, at 44 (quoted in Daily Telegraph).
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